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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid had a bright idea. While nomi-
nally in recess over Thanksgiving, Reid enlisted senators to return to the empty
Senate chamber every few days to conduct pro forma sessions.' These sessions,
typically no longer than thirty seconds each,' successfully prevented
then-President George W. Bush from making a recess appointment of a contro-
versial new Surgeon General.' Following this success, Democrats deployed this
device throughout the remainder of President Bush's term in office. Bush, who
had made forty recess appointments in 20o6 alone,4 had been on pace to sur-
pass President Ronald Reagan's all-time record of 243.1 But because of the Reid
maneuver, Bush made none at all in his final twenty-one months in office.6 In
late 2010, the Senate Republicans returned the favor: They forced the Demo-
crat-controlled Senate to revive the Reid maneuver to block a batch of President
Barack Obama's nominees during the break before the midterm elections.!
1. 153 CONG. REC. 31,874 (2007) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) ("Mr. President, the
Senate will be coming in for pro forma sessions during the Thanksgiving holiday
to prevent recess appointments.").
2. See Carl Hulse, Loneliest Man in Town? He's on the Senate Floor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2007, at Ai6.
3. Dr. James Holsinger's nomination to be Surgeon General had stalled in the Se-
nate. Democrats opposed the nomination in part because of anti-gay statements
Holsinger had made earlier in his career. See Gardner Harris, Nominee for Surgeon
General Testifies He Would Not Give In to Politics, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A15
(noting that a 1991 paper that Holsinger wrote for a church committee characte-
rized homosexual sex as "unnatural and unhealthy").
4. HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL33310, RE-
CESs APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, JANUARY 20,
2001-OCTOBER 31, 20o8, at 2 (2oo8).
5. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TOTAL RECESS APPOINTMENTS, BY PRESIDENT,
1933-201o, available at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/
TotalRecessAppointmentsl933-present.pdf (last updated July 6, 2010).
6. HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 4, at 15, 19; see also Paul Kane, As 2n1th Senate Is Set
To Begin, Four Seats Still Up in Air, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2009, at A3; Victor Wil-
liams, Op-Ed., Senate Pro Forma Follies; Obama's Recess Appointment Authority Is
Not Limited by the Sham Sessions, 33 NAT'L L.J. 51 (2010).
7. See Alexander Bolton, Senate Blocks Recess Appointments with Deal Between Dems,
GOP, HILL (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.thehill.com/homenews/senate/121775
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Again the maneuver successfully impeded the President from making any recess
appointments. Republicans have since used the maneuver many times against
Obama.'
This new development is both symptom and cause in our government's
plagued appointments process. Vacancies atop the federal bureaucracy and in
the courts created by delays at all stages of the appointments process have
begun to cripple our government in unprecedented ways.9 The Supreme
Court's 201o decision in New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, demon-
strates the harm posed by this paralysis to effective governance. The Court nul-
lified more than two years' worth of National Labor Relations Board decisions,
finding that the board lacked a quorum of members during that period as re-
-senate-blocks-recess-appointments. Obama was on pace to match or surpass
Bush's ranking in total recess appointments. By the end of his second year in
office, Bush had made twenty-three recess appointments. HOGUE & BEARDEN, SU-
pra note 4, at 2. As of January 2011, the end of Obama's second year, he had made
twenty-eight. See Ed O'Keefe, Amid Recess, Obama Makes 4 Appointments, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 20, 2010, at A2o; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Six Recess Appointments To Be
Made, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2010, at A18.
8. In May 2011, the Senate conducted pro forma sessions during the Memorial Day
break to block a potential recess appointment of Professor Elizabeth Warren to
lead the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Alexander Bolton & Josiah Ryan,
GOP Forces Senate Pro-Forma Session, FLOOR ACTION BLOG, HILL (May 26, 2011,
7:47 PM), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/163635-gop-pressure
-forces-senate-to-work-in-pro-forma-session-blocking-elizabeth-warren-recess
-appointment; Scott Wong, Senate GOP Blocks Recess Appointments, POLITICO'S
ON CONGRESS (May 26, 2011, 9:26 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/
glennthrush/o511/Obama-cantmake-recess-appointments next-week.html. The
Senate conducted the sessions again during the late August, early September
break. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Sometimes a Day in Congress Takes Seconds, Gavel
to Gavel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at A12; Pete Kasperowicz, House Forces Pro-
Forma Sessions To Avoid Recess Appointments, HILL's FLOOR ACTION BLOG (Aug.
4, 2011, 9:29 AM), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/175449-house
-forces-pro-forma-sessions-in-august-to-avoid-obama-recess-appointments; see
also 157 CONG. REC. S5,292 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
One of the pro forma sessions had to be held outside of the Capitol after an
earthquake forced an evacuation. Carl Hulse, Senate Convenes Unusual Session Af-
ter Earthquake, CAUCUS, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://thecaucus
.blogs.nytimes.com/2onl/o8/23/senate-convenes-unusual-session-after-earthquake
("[Senator Chris] Coons sat at a plain, short folding table with the Senate seal
pinned to a curtain behind him.").
9. See, e.g., ANNE JOSEPH O'CONNELL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WAITING FOR LEA-
DERSHIP: PRESIDENT OBAMA'S RECORD IN STAFFING KEY AGENCY POSITIONS AND
How To IMPROVE THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 11-12 (2010), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1607263 [hereinafter O'CONNELL, WAITING]; Anne
Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 913, 937-38 (2009) [hereinafter O'Connell, Vacant]; see also infra
Section III.A.
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quired under the statute. These unfilled vacancies were a direct product of the
Reid maneuver."o
In this appointments deadlock, the President's power under the Recess
Appointments Clause (RAC)" has been transformed into a constitutional safety
valve-relieving the pressure of mounting vacancies and ensuring that the Pres-
ident has the ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. The politi-
cal backlash provoked by recess appointments has kept them relatively rare, but
they had remained a fallback option in every modern President's arsenal." Now,
the pro forma sessions threaten to deprive the President of this safety valve.
Though neither President Obama nor President Bush opted to challenge
these sessions, a sudden crisis while they are in force might provoke a future
President to "call the Senate's bluff" on these sessions, as some have urged. 4 A
resulting interbranch face-off may warrant judicial resolution. What, if any,
constitutional principles might guide such a judicial intervention into the
appointments thicket?
Courts have adjudicated the constitutionality of recess appointments, but
only rarely and with much hesitation and deference." Challengers in these cases
argued for a restricted reading of the RAC on originalist grounds. The Clause
10. See New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010); see also infra Section III.B.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
12. Total recess appointments made by Presidents since 1933:
Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945) = 89
Harry Truman (1945-1953) = 195
Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961) = 193
John Kennedy (1961-1963) = 53
Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969) = 36
Richard Nixon (1969-1974) = 41
Gerald Ford (1974-1977) = 12
James Carter (1977-1981) = 68
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) = 243
George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) = 77
William Clinton (1993-2001) 139
George W. Bush (2001-2009) - 171
Barack Obama (2009-2011) = 28
Data assembled from various sources. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 5;
HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS213o8, RECESS APPOINTMENTS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2010); HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 4; Stol-
berg, supra note 7; see also infra Part III.
13. For instance, neither President made a recess appointment notwithstanding the
pro forma maneuver, which might have forced the Senate to bring a challenge. See
infra Section IV.C.
14. See Steven G. Bradbury & John P. Elwood, Op-Ed., Call the Senate's Bluff on Recess
Appointments, WASH. PosT, Oct. 15, 2010, at A19.
15. See infra Section I.C.
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was designed around a Senate that would be in session only a few months each
year. Challengers argued that today's expanded congressional calendar and
updated communications and travel technologies have rendered the power to
skip Senate "Advice and Consent" essentially moot. But, courts declined these
invitations to intervene in the appointments process. Finding the originalist
evidence unconvincing or equivocal, these courts deferred to the political
branches to "work out" the appointments conflicts themselves.
This Note criticizes this deferential approach and argues for a bolder judi-
cial intervention to preserve the recess appointments safety valve. For an inter-
pretive method to guide such intervention, courts must look beyond the origi-
nalism and deference that define the lower courts' RAC jurisprudence, and
instead draw upon the Supreme Court's precedent on presidential control over
personnel. To this point, however, this jurisprudence has been methodological-
ly asymmetrical. In ruling on the President's removal power-in cases from
Humphrey's Executor v. United States" to Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Ac-
counting Oversight Board"--the Supreme Court has engaged dynamically with
the principle of effective governance embodied in the Vesting and Take Care
Clauses of Article II, 8 applied this principle to contemporary governmental
context, and generated new rules and holdings to guide future practice.' 9 In the
removal cases, the Court has often been self-consciously attuned both to origi-
nal underlying principles of the text as well as to modern governmental context.
In contrast, lower courts in the RAC cases have avoided any such creativity or
overt attention to contemporary context. Instead, they have approached the is-
sue statically, as a choice between original meaning-based intervention and de-
ference to the political branches.2 o
This strategy of deference has allowed the courts to avoid engaging more
dynamically with the RAC to this point, but an interbranch conflict over pro
forma sessions could render deference less appealing." This Note argues that
the creative, dynamic method that has guided the Court's removal power juri-
sprudence should also guide a future court's determination of the constitution-
ality of the pro forma sessions.
Under the interpretive method of the removal cases, the pro forma sessions
should be struck down as unconstitutional. In the contemporary governmental
context, where recess appointments have taken on a crucial safety valve func-
tion to protect the President's ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully
16. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
17. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
18. See U.S. CONsT. art. tt, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent of the United States of America."); U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3 ("[H]e shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.").
19. See infra Section I.B.
20. See infra Section I.C.
21. See infra Section IV.B.
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executed, the value of effective governance embodied in the RAC mandates the
preservation of some minimal presidential access to this essential appointment
method." The pro forma sessions constitute an impermissible obstruction of
this constitutional safety valve, and should be rejected.
Though the pro forma sessions have already begun to reshape the ap-
pointments landscape, they have received scant attention from constitutional
scholars. One author lauded them as a rare example of the Senate asserting its
power against a domineering executive." But this approach fails to engage the
principles embedded in the RAC, and ignores the institutional harms that these
sessions have already caused beyond the executive.24 Other commentators sug-
gest that the pro forma sessions are not real sessions or that the "three-day
minimum" rule that underlies them is itself constitutionally faulty." These ar-
guments may provide plausible rationalizations for a judicial ruling against the
sessions, but they similarly fail to grapple with the underlying values of the RAC
in the modern appointments context, or with previous cases on the RAC or re-
moval powers. This Note is the first effort to comprehensively address the con-
stitutional significance of the pro forma sessions.
Even if the pro forma sessions maneuver is judicially eliminated, the mod-
ern appointments dysfunction still arguably violates the principle of effective
governance embedded in the RAC, Article II, and the constitutional separation
of powers. Judicial review of the pro forma sessions might present an opportu-
nity for a court to intervene more robustly into this process. This Note
concludes by proposing two possible routes for such an intervention.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I establishes the methodological
asymmetry between the removal and appointments cases and argues for resolv-
ing this asymmetry in favor of the dynamic removal case interpretive method.
Part II begins laying the foundation for the application of this method to the
pro forma sessions by articulating the principle of effective governance embo-
died in the RAC. Part III completes this groundwork by reviewing the modern
22. See infra Section IV.C.
23. See Blake Denton, While the Senate Sleeps: Do Contemporary Events Warrant a
New Interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 751,
776-77 (2009).
24. See infra Section III.B.
25. See Bradbury & Elwood, supra note 14; Victor Williams, Recess Appoint Peter
Diamond: Senate Pro Forma Sessions Do Not Limit Obama's Recess Appointment
Authority, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. n1, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
victor-williams/recess-appoint-peter-diam_b_758857.html; Williams, supra note 6.
26. See Marty Lederman, The Constitutional Significance of the Thanksgiving Weekend
(or, Constitutional Hardball and Recess Appointments), BALKINIZATION (Nov.
21, 2007, 10:21 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/11/constitutional-significance
-of.html.
27. See infra Part V.
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appointments context and the role of recess appointments as a constitutional
safety valve. Part IV applies the removal case method to the pro forma sessions
by combining the original principle of effective governance from Part II with
the modern context provided in Part III, and argues that these sessions should
be rejected. Part V proposes two routes by which a court might use this inter-
vention as a wedge into the appointments landscape more broadly."
I. ASYMMETRICAL METHODOLOGY IN APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVAL CASES
The jurisprudence on presidential control over personnel is methodologi-
cally asymmetrical. In removal power cases, the Supreme Court has translated
broad principles embodied in Article II and the separation of powers onto the
contemporary administrative context, generating new rules and holdings de-
signed to guide future practice. Viewed in concert, rather than in the usual
"formalist" and "functionalist" groupings, some significant commonalities
emerge in the interpretive method across all of these cases. This method is deci-
dedly non-originalist, and actually bears some similarities to several contempo-
rary alternatives to originalist interpretation, such as Professor Lawrence
Lessig's concept of "fidelity in translation," 9 and Professor William Eskridge's
"dynamic" theory.30 Above all, this creative judicial engagement with contem-
porary context contrasts starkly with the originalist and deferential approach
taken by lower courts in adjudicating the President's power to make recess ap-
pointments. The two issues are intimately related; both concern congressionally
imposed limits on the President's ability to control the federal bureaucracy as
part of his constitutional responsibility to "take care" that the laws be faithfully
executed. Yet, rather than adopt the approach of the removal cases, the courts
reviewing the RAC have framed the question rigidly, as a choice between origi-
nalist intervention or deference to the political branches. These courts ignore
changes in the appointments context, abjure any judicial creativity in formulat-
ing solutions, and instead allow the branches to work out the boundaries
themselves.
28. Judicial and executive appointments raise distinct issues. The President's Article II
duty to "take care" is tied more closely to his ability to appoint executive officers
than judges. And Article III imposes distinct rules regarding the tenure and salary
of federal judges that implicate the conditions of their appointment. Notwith-
standing these important distinctions, however, this Note will treat judicial and
executive appointments together in order to articulate broader themes in the RAC
jurisprudence. It will not ignore these distinctions and will flag them where they
arise throughout.
29. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
30. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); see
also infra Section I.A.
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This Part reconstructs and criticizes this methodological asymmetry in the
jurisprudence on executive personnel. It begins by briefly sketching the two me-
thods of interpretation. It follows by describing the two lines of cases following
these methods. Finally, it argues for resolving the asymmetry in favor of the
translation-style approach adopted in the removal cases.
A. Originalism vs. Translation; Minimalism vs. Creativity
If constitutional interpretation aims at fidelity to the text, is there any place
for consideration of contemporary context? Originalists think not. Originalists
of different stripes are all united by a conception of fidelity that requires atten-
tion only to some aspect of a text's original history-whether the focus is on a
text's ordinary meaning, on the specific intent of its drafters, or on its overarch-
ing purpose.3' For instance, when evaluating whether a handgun ban violates
the Second Amendment, the textualist mode of originalism does not pay atten-
tion to changes in weapons technology, urban living conditions, or patterns
of gun violence, but only whether the text of that Amendment, as originally
understood, protected the individual right to bear arms.32
Originalist interpretation, perhaps especially its textualist modes, jibes with
a taste for judicial minimalism and deference to the political branches.
Although originalism's results are certainly not minimalist,3' its constrained
vision of the interpretive function facilitates a clean division between judicial
and legislative functions that appeals to those who mistrust judicial power.
Under this view, courts look backward, not forward. Their role requires accura-
cy, not creativity.34
31. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 13-48 (categorizing purposivist, intentionalist, and
textualist methods of statutory interpretation together as "archaeological" and
"originalist" methods).
32. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2oo8) (Scalia, J.).
33. Consider the Court's recent Second Amendment jurisprudential revolution. Rely-
ing on a new reading of the original meaning of the Second Amendment, the
Court struck down the District of Columbia's statute regulating handguns, Heller,
554 U.S. 570, and then curtailed other states' ability to enact gun control restric-
tions, McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010) (incorporating the Second
Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against the states). Neither result could fairly be described as "minimalist." Results
aside, textualism's mechanical jurisprudence has unmistakable appeal to judicial
minimalists, who see it as a constraint on the illegitimate and undemocratic exer-
cise of unbounded judicial power. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3-25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(criticizing the "common law" method of interpretation as antidemocratic).
34. See SCALIA, supra note 33.
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Judicial restraint itself has a prestigious theoretical pedigree. Professor Jesse
Choper proposed that the judiciary should refrain from deciding any "constitu-
tional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress and the Presi-
dent vis-A-vis one another"-that these questions "should be held to be nonjus-
ticiable, their final resolution to be remitted to the interplay of the national
political process."35 He argued that both political branches are well equipped to
defend their own constitutional turf without assistance from the courts.
Channeling The Federalist, Choper asserted that each branch "has tremendous
incentives jealously to guard its constitutional boundaries and assigned pre-
rogatives against invasion by the other," and noted the "impressive arsenal of
weapons" in each branch's possession to enforce its constitutional preroga-
tives.36 Choper argued that these devices would suffice to constrain the execu-
tive from overreaching.3 7
Professor Choper's judicial minimalism follows in the tradition of Profes-
sor Alexander Bickel, who urged courts to exercise "passive virtues"-
employing justiciability doctrines to avoid adjudicating difficult or sensitive
political cases." Bickel aimed to minimize or mitigate the infamous "coun-
ter-majoritarian difficulty"-the problem of an undemocratic Court sitting in
judgment over the acts of a democratically elected legislature.39 Similarly,
Choper sought to preserve the Court's "special role" in government. Having
observed "the penchant of politicians in all respect and deference to pass diffi-
cult and provocative matters to the Court only to respond to an adverse deci-
sion ... with hostility and intimidation," 4o Choper suggests that the costs of
such judicial interventions into politics outweigh any benefit. Fearing that oth-
erwise "the Court will be damaged,"41 he sought to minimize the needless "ex-
35. JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263
(1980); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 294 (James Madison) (ABA ed., 2009) ("But
the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of
the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made
commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition.").
36. CHOPER, supra note 35, at 275.
37. Choper suggested that intra-executive bureaucratic inertia, outside interest
groups, various limits imposed by Congress (including rejecting appointments),
and the "check of the electorate" would combine to provide an effective "check."
Id. at 276-312.
38. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962).
39. Id. at 16-23.
40. CHOPER, supra note 35, at 334.
41. Id. at 323.
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penditure of precious judicial capital."4 ' These minimalist and deferential ideas
are the second major theme, along with originalism, in the RAC opinions dis-
cussed below.43
Originalism and minimalism have also been challenged. As Professor
Lessig put it, just as a belch after dinner in Baghdad conveys different informa-
tion than one at Buckingham Palace, so too a piece of text may require different
interpretations to preserve the same meaning in different background con-
texts." If textualists are "one-step" originalists, Lessig promotes a "two-step"
method: After the original meaning of a clause is derived, it then must be trans-
lated into current context in order to preserve that original meaning.45 Justice
Jackson articulated a different version of the translation method in his land-
mark post-New Deal opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, acknowledging its unavoidable call for judicial creativity with a horticul-
tural metaphor:
[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth
century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems
of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence. These prin-
ciples grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual
was the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere
absence of governmental restraints, and that government should be en-
trusted with few controls, and only the mildest supervision over men's
affairs. We must transplant these rights to a soil in which the lais-
sez-faire concept or principle of noninterference has withered at least
as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought
through closer integration of society and through expanded and
strengthened governmental controls.46
Such transplanting plainly lacks originalism's credibility-conserving judicial
minimalism. It openly requires judicial creativity in translating original values
into contemporary context and thereby threatens to blur the lines between leg-
islative and judicial roles. Jackson acknowledged this creativity as an inescapable
implication of the translation method, which "cast[s] us more than we would
42. Id. at 275.
43. See infra Section I.C.
44. Lessig, supra note 29, at 1170-71.
45. Id. at 1252-61.
46. 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943) (Jackson, J.). Jackson's concept of transplanting expli-
citly incorporates changes not just in social and economic, but also in governrmen-
tal contexts. Id. Professor Eskridge's theory of "dynamic" interpretation also
encompasses changes in legal and political contexts. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 30,
at 52-55, 125-28. The "governmental context" factor, which Lessig's model of trans-
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choose upon our own judgment."4 7 But, Jackson insisted, "[w]e cannot, because
of modest estimates of our competence ... withhold the judgment that history
authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is infringed." 4
Translation, like other theories that call for even more open engagement
with contemporary context,4 9 provokes the minimalist's anxiety about conserv-
ing judicial credibility. But, such concerns about conserving judicial credibility
may be misguided. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes that "the federal courts'
legitimacy is quite robust,""o which makes Choper's credibility-conserving con-
cerns seem overblown. Further, Professor Andrew Koppelman recently argued
that even Bush v. Gore-a credibility-straining case if ever there was-"did no
harm at all to the Court's prestige in the eyes of the public."51
These two interpretive schemes (originalism and translation) and judicial
philosophies (minimalism and creativity) map onto two lines of precedent deal-
ing with the President's control over personnel. The next two Sections discuss
these in turn.
B. Removal Cases: Translation and Creativity
In cases adjudicating the President's removal power, the Supreme Court
has constructed various boundaries based on the President's constitutional duty
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."" Removal power cases are
47. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.
48. Id.
49. Other non-originalist theories of interpretation, such as Professor Eskridge's
theory of "dynamic" statutory interpretation, seem to justify a more open-ended
engagement with contemporary context than does translation. Eskridge writes:
"Statutes are enacted ... with certain consequences in mind, but whether those
consequences actually occur. . . depends on a series of assumptions about people
and institutions, about society and its mores, and about law and policy."
ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 52. Over time, as these assumptions inevitably unra-
vel, "subsequent interpreters will apply the statute in ways unanticipated by the
original drafters." Id. This approach is distinct from translation, which sees itself
not as facilitating the abandonment of the original meaning, but as actually
improving upon the originalist mission of "fidelity."
50. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 132 (2d
ed. 2002); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at viii (2d
ed. 1988) ("[T]he highest mission of the Supreme Court... is not to conserve
judicial credibility."); Benjamin Ewing & Douglas Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited
Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 415 n.241 (2011).
51. Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality
of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2011), http://www
.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/981.pdf (citing Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of
Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDI-
CATURE 32 (2001)).
52. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
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typically bifurcated into those adopting "formalist" and "functionalist" reason-
ing. Actually, this distinction is a second-order one, and there are significant
methodological commonalities across removal cases, especially when contrasted
with the RAC cases. The Court finds no precise line drawn by the constitutional
text regarding the limits on the President's removal powers. It also finds that the
relevant governmental context has changed dramatically since 1787; the modern
administrative state has created institutional capabilities and threats not con-
templated by the Framers. No constitutional clause addresses independent
agencies, independent prosecutors, or multiple layers of "for cause" removal
protection. A Choperian court would, perhaps, note the fact that the Constitu-
tion provides mechanisms for the political branches to work out this balance
themselves-i.e., a President could veto any bill that unduly restricts his remov-
al power-and decline to enter the political fray. But rather than letting the
political branches negotiate the boundaries amongst themselves, the Court has
intervened repeatedly to construct and police these boundaries around Con-
gress' ability to restrict the removal power.
The Court, in other words, has engaged in a dynamic, creative mode of
constitutional interpretation. First abstracting from Article II's Vesting and
Take Care Clauses the underlying principle of effective execution of the laws,
the Court then translates this principle onto the relevant contemporary context:
the modern administrative state, with its independent agencies, quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative functions, and intended independence from presidential
control." Only after engaging in this two-step enterprise does the second-order
consideration come into play; in some cases, the Court invents a new formalistic
rule to guide future practice, while in others it resolves the case with
open-ended balancing. In either case, the Court's underlying reasoning exceeds
one-step originalism.5 4
In Myers v. United States," the Court struck down a statute that condi-
tioned the President's ability to remove postmasters on the Senate's consent.56
The Court found it a "reasonable implication" from the Take Care Clause that
53. Consideration of changed governmental context is a departure from Lessigian
translation. Lessig's theory accommodates changes in social and economic con-
texts, not governmental ones. Lessig, supra note 29, at 1233-50. Other theories of
interpretation do allow for these kinds of changes, including Justice Jackson's
conception of transplanting, see supra note 46, and Professor Eskridge's "dynam-
ic" interpretation, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1497 (1987) (applying the theory of dynamic interpretation
to changes in both "Societal/Policy Context" as well as "Public Values").
54. As these removal cases are familiar, I review them only briefly. For a more detailed
review, see KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
310-11 (16th ed. 2007).
55. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
56. Id. at 175-76.
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the President "should select those who were to act for him under his direction
in the execution of the laws." 7 It followed that "as his selection of administra-
tive officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must be his pow-
er of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible."'"
Myers was distinguished by the Court in Humphrey's Executor,9 in which
the Court upheld a statutory "for cause" restriction on the President's ability to
remove members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) by translating the
values embedded in the separation of powers and Article II onto modern go-
vernmental context. This context had changed significantly since 1926: The
Depression, Roosevelt's election, and the first New Deal had all begun to trans-
form government and create a new form of executive power. The FTC was
emblematic of that change. The FTC was designed to be "free from executive
control," and could not "in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an
eye of the executive."6o Rather, the FTC was both quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial.6' To translate the original principles of Article I and the separa-
tion of powers into this altered governmental context, the Court constructed a
formalist line between purely executive agencies on the one hand (like the
postmasters) and quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agents on the other." The
translation of original values onto the new governmental context produced a
creative new formalistic boundary.
The Humphrey's Executor approach was confirmed in Wiener v. United
States,6 3 where the Court restricted the President's ability to remove a member
of the War Claims Commission on the grounds that the commission had an
"intrinsic judicial character."64 This method expressly contemplates the modern
context in which such independent executive actors are part of the administra-
tive reality. Wiener, thus, is another exercise in translating original values into
changed governmental context.
57. Id. at n7; see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 54, at 310-11.
58. Myers, 272 U.S. at 117.
59. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
6o. Id. at 628.
61. Id. at 630 ("The power of removal here claimed for the President falls within this
principle, since its coercive influence threatens the independence of a commission
which is not only wholly disconnected from the executive department, but which,
as already fully appears, was created by Congress as a means of carrying into oper-
ation legislative and judicial powers, and as an agency of the legislative and judi-
cial departments.").
62. Id.
63. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
64. Id. at 355; see also id. at 353 ("[Tlhis sharp differentiation derives from the differ-
ence in functions between those who are part of the Executive establishment and
those whose tasks require absolute freedom from Executive interference.").
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In Morrison v. Olson,6 5 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Inde-
pendent Counsel Statute's "for cause" removal restriction. Under the Humph-
rey's Executor rule, since prosecution is a "core" executive function, the Inde-
pendent Counsel was a "purely executive" officer and any restrictions on his
removability unconstitutionally undermined the separation of powers. This
approach, favored by Justice Scalia in dissent,"6 would have conserved judicial
credibility by relying on a previously articulated formalist rule, and by avoiding
overt engagement with changes in governmental context since that rule was in-
vented. The majority famously distanced itself from this formalistic approach."
It reread earlier cases, finding that their underlying thrust was "not to define ri-
gid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the
President," but rather "to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the Pres-
ident's exercise of the 'executive power' and his constitutional appointed duty
to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' under Article II."'" The "real
question" for the Court was whether the removal power restrictions "impede [d]
the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty."6 9
Abjuring firm lines and clear boundaries between branch functions, the
Court embraced a balancing, functionalist approach that required evaluating
the impact that the statute would have on each branch.7o The Morrison Court's
rejection of the earlier formalist rule, and its embrace of this balancing test, im-
plicitly recognized significant changes in governmental context since the forma-
listic rule announced by Humphrey's Executor-changes that required further
translation of the original purpose of Article II's commands. In the 1970s, the
Watergate scandal undermined trust in government and raised the need for
some independent accountability mechanism to police the executive branch
from within. The Court's functionalist test of whether one branch encroached
or aggrandized its power at the expense of another branch separates it from the
earlier cases, but its underlying attention to both original principle and modern
context actually parallels them.7 ' By announcing this new standard, the Court
acknowledged that the change in the role of executive power since Humphrey's
Executor necessitated a new interpretation of the limits of the removal power.
65. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
66. Id. at 703-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 687-94.
68. Id. at 689-90.
69. Id. at 691.
70. See id. at 687-94.
71. Id. at 693 ("[Tlhe system of separated powers and checks and balances established
in the Constitution was regarded by the Framers as 'a self-executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other."' (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976))).
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Most recently, in Free Enterprise Fund,72 the Court relied on contextualist
reasoning to arrive at a new formalist "punch line."73 The Court found that two
layers of "just cause" insulation from removal 4 impeded too much on the Pres-
ident's removal power. Again, the Constitution does not specify any line in this
area. The Court balanced values embedded in Article II in light of contempo-
rary governmental context and found that two layers was one too many. The
Court employed a contextualist analysis to assess the problem and constructed a
formalist rule to provide guidance for Congress going forward.
Free Enterprise Fund demonstrates the modern Court's willingness to en-
gage in openly creative analysis in executive personnel cases, and not simply de-
fer to the branches to negotiate the proper boundaries themselves, even where
there is no originalist guidance from the constitutional text. It also may expose
the danger of this approach: that the Court will distort the carefully calibrated
interactions between the political branches with unnecessary and cumbersome
rules. As Justice Breyer noted in dissent, "[T]he Court fails to show why two
layers of 'for cause' protection-Layer One insulating the Commissioners from
the President, and Layer Two insulating the Board from the Commissioners-
impose any more serious limitation upon the President's powers than one
layer." 7 A single layer of "for cause" removal protection at the top level, which
the Court has long permitted, would effectively block a President from reaching
the lower ranking officials. Thus, Presidential control over the operations of the
executive branch seems unaffected by the second layer of removal protection. If
Justice Breyer is correct and the Free Enterprise Fund rule is an unnecessary in-
trusion, this case might lend support to the minimalist approach adopted in
RAC cases:76 Where no rigid originalist boundaries exist, courts should simply
defer to the political branches to work it out amongst themselves.
Such errors of judicial overreach may be an unavoidable side effect of the
translation approach, which, as Justice Jackson recognized, "cast[s] [judges]
more than [they] would choose upon [their] own judgment."" Still, before
choosing one or the other methodology, the costs of translation's risk of judicial
overreach must be weighed against the costs of minimalism's risk of
72. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
73. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism
in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 26 (1998) (arguing
that it is possible to have a "functionalist argument for a formalist punch line").
74. Under the challenged scheme, members of Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board could only be removed by SEC Commissioners for cause, and the
Commissioners themselves could only be removed by the President for cause. See
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138.
75. Id. at 3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. ("[T]he majority's decision to elimi-
nate only Layer Two accomplishes virtually nothing.").
76. See infra Section I.C.
77. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
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underreach. In the Sections that follow, I will argue that the minimalist
approach adopted in the RAC context has enacted very high, though often
ignored, underreaching costs, which justify resolving the judicial asymmetry in
favor of translation.
C. Recess Appointments Clause Cases: Originalism and Minimalism
In removal cases, the Court has applied underlying constitutional principles
drawn from Article II and the separation of powers to the modern governmen-
tal context, and engaged in overt acts of judicial creativity to formulate new
boundaries around presidential power. One might suspect that in cases testing
the boundaries of the President's power to make recess appointments, courts
would follow a similar approach. This power, like the power to remove officers,
is undoubtedly an important part of the President's constitutional mandate to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.78 Indeed, the recess appointments
power may possess an even stronger connection to this fundamental executive
responsibility; unlike the removal power, the recess power is actually crystal-
lized in text.79 But, courts reviewing the RAC have not embraced the dynamic
78. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 ("The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacan-
cies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.").
79. It could be reasonably argued that the very absence of constitutional text in the
removal cases is precisely the justification for the creativity that the Supreme
Court has consistently exercised in this area of the law. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra
note 53, at 1481-97 (outlining a framework in which the text and history hold more
weight for more specific provisions, and dynamic considerations hold more
weight for general or vague provisions). This argument-that the more minimal
the text, the greater extent of permissible judicial creativity-brings the task of
constitutional interpretation uncomfortably close to that of full-blown
common-law-style norm-generation. Cf SCALIA, supra note 33, at 22 (criticizing
Eskridge's "dynamic" method of interpretation as, essentially, applying the com-
mon law method of judging to statutory interpretation). The descriptive version
of this argument takes the removal cases as not interpreting the Constitution's
"Take Care" and "Vesting" Clauses, but rather engaging in common-law-style
rule-generation based on ad hoc policy judgments. Interpretation as translation is
distinct from this approach, associated with Ronald Dworkin, among others. See
RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 313-54 (1986) (arguing for a conception of
interpretation similar to common law adjudication); Eskridge, supra note 53, at
1549-54 (distinguishing Dworkin's theory from his own). The judicial creativity
envisioned by translation is more circumscribed; it is meant to be bounded by the
principles embodied in the text. The distinction may be difficult to observe or to
sustain in practice. See John 0. McGinnis, The Inevitable Infidelities of Constitu-
tional Translation: The Case of the New Deal, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 179
(1999) ("[Tjhe process of translating the Constitution on the basis of changed so-
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approach of the removal cases. Rather than engaging with the underlying prin-
ciples or modern governmental context, these courts have opted for a strategy
of credibility-conserving judicial minimalism. This Section reconstructs and
interprets these minimalist decisions.
Virtually all modern Presidents have made extensive use of the RAC to ap-
point executive officers and federal judges without the Senate's "advice and
consent.'o Several of these attempts have been challenged in federal court."
Challengers have relied on originalist hooks to ask courts to restrict the recess
power to situations in which the Senate was unable, rather than merely unwil-
ling, to provide its consent to a nominee." The Senate is no longer incapable of
giving its advice and consent for eight or nine months out of the year as it was
at the founding. The originally conferred powers of the RAC have been mooted
by developments in communications and travel technologies and the expansion
of the legislative calendar.
Courts have almost universally rejected this argument. Only one modern
court found that the President overstepped his recess power authority-a deci-
sion that was promptly overturned en banc.3 Rather than attending to contem-
porary context or creatively generating new rules, as the Court has done repeat-
edly in removal cases, courts have approached RAC adjudications statically: a
choice between originalism on the one hand and judicial abdication to the po-
cial facts is an inherently more complex and open-ended task than Professor
Lessig acknowledges-so complex and open-ended that it is unsuitable for
judges."). But, the distinction is still important to understanding the project of in-
terpretation as translation on its own conceptual terms. See Lessig, supra note 29,
at 12o6. Under the translation model, principles crystallized in text create a strong
justification for judicial creativity in the name of preserving those principles.
8o. See supra note 12 (listing the number of recess appointments made by every Presi-
dent since Franklin Roosevelt).
81. See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Woodley
(Woodley II), 751 F.2d 1008 (9 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704,
705 (2d Cir. 1962); Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D.D.C. 1993); Staebler v.
Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585 (D.D.C. 1979); In re Farrow, 3 F. 112 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880);
In re Dist. Att'y of United States, 7 F. Cas. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1868) (No. 3924).
82. More specifically, litigants argued that the Clause's reference to "the Recess of the
Senate" includes only intersession, not intrasession, recesses; that "Vacancies that
may happen" includes only vacancies that arise during a recess, not those that
merely exist during one; and that "Vacancies" excludes Article III judges. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Stephens, 387 F-3d 1220, 1225 (iith Cir. 2004) (considering and rejecting
the intrasession argument); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 705 (2d Cir.
1962) (considering and rejecting the "arise" argument); id. at 708 (considering and
rejecting the argument that Article III excludes recess appointments).
83. See United States v. Woodley (Woodley 1), 726 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en
banc, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985). An 1868 case also ruled against the President's
recess power. See In re Dist. Att'y of United States, 7 F. Cas. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1868).
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litical branches on the other. Even as the appointments process deteriorated
during the late twentieth century, becoming an increasing burden not just on
the President's ability to "take care" that the laws be faithfully executed, but also
on the courts, Congress, and the citizens who give these actors power to govern,
courts avoided intervening.
In Evans v. Stephens, the Eleventh Circuit upheld President George W.
Bush's recess appointment of William Pryor to that court, relying on a com-
bined approach of minimalism and "one-step" originalism. The court searched
for, and could not find, any originalist limit on the President's power to make
recess appointments: "The Constitution, on its face, does not establish a mini-
mum time that an authorized break in the Senate must last to give legal force to
the President's appointment power under the Recess Appointments Clause."4
Finding no determinative originalist guidance, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a
deferential posture. It noted that although "[tihe Judicial Branch is the control-
ling interpreter of how the Constitution applies[,] ... the President, in his
capacity as chief executive of this country is also sworn to uphold the Constitu-
tion."" Noting that the challenged use of the recess power was "consistent
with... written executive interpretations from as early as 1823, and legislative
acquiescence,"" the court declined to intervene.
A credibility-conserving court would avoid such political controversy. Judi-
cial appointments under President Bush were an intensely fraught partisan bat-
tleground, and any judicial interference would have expended considerable
"judicial capital." Pryor, then the Attorney General of Alabama, was Bush's
second nominee to fill the position on the Eleventh Circuit; the first nominee
failed to win confirmation, was sent back to the President at the conclusion of
the 1o7th Congress, and was not renominated in the 1o8th Congress." When
Pryor received his nomination in April 2003, he was part of a batch of aggressive
choices for positions on the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Pryor's nomination was
successfully voted out of the Judiciary Committee, but the Democratic minority
blocked the full vote for the remainder of that session and into the next. In this
highly politicized context, it is easy to understand why a court might avoid the
dynamic, flexible removal case method, with its overt judicial engagement with
contemporary governmental context.
84. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1225.
85. Id. at 1222.
86. Id. at 1226.
87. Id. at 1222 ("Just to show that plausible interpretations of the pertinent constitu-
tional clause exist other than that advanced by the President is not enough.").
88. The nominee was William H. Steele. See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUs, KEVIN M. SCOTT
& MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL31868, U.S. CIRCUIT AND Dis-
TRICT COURT NOMINATIONS By PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH DURING THE
1o7TH-1o9TH CONGRESSES 15 n-59 (2007).
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In fact, by turning to judicial minimalism and deference to the political
branches, the Eleventh Circuit followed solid judicial precedent. A
nineteenth-century case, In Re Farrow,' introduced the minimalist methodolo-
gy that still defines RAC jurisprudence. Henry Farrow's term as U.S. District
Attorney for Georgia was set to expire in April 188o.9 o President Rutherford B.
Hayes sought to replace him, but before the President could act, Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Bradley reappointed Farrow to a second term, as he was purpor-
tedly entitled to do under law.91 President Hayes followed by nominating John
S. Bigby. The Senate failed to vote on Bigby's nomination before recess, and
Hayes issued a recess appointment to Bigby over the summer. 92
Farrow, whose tenure had been cut short by this recess appointment, chal-
lenged the appointment's constitutionality. He advanced textualist arguments
similar to those relied on by modern RAC challengers: Because the vacancy had
arisen while the Senate was still in session, he argued, the recess appointment
power was not properly available.93 Moreover, Farrow continued, once Justice
Bradley had reappointed him to the position, there was no longer any
"vacancy" under the meaning of the RAC.9 4
The district court soundly rejected both arguments, deferring to the execu-
tive's own constitutional interpretation. The court relied exclusively on the opi-
nions of the "distinguished jurists who have filled the office of attorney
general."95 Attorneys General William Wirt,"' Roger Taney,97 and ten others be-
sides, had each uniformly found that the word "happen" in the RAC meant
"happen to exist,"9' rather than arise, as Farrow argued. The executive's own
lawyers had consistently held that the timing of the origins of the vacancy was
constitutionally irrelevant, and the district court was not eager to question these
opinions. After all, they "were rendered upon the call of the executive depart-
ment, and under the obligation of the oath of office, and are entitled to the
highest consideration."99 These opinions were authored by "distinguished jur-
ists" in the executive branch, and deserving of deference.
89. In re Farrow, 3 F. 112 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880).
90. Id. at 112.
91. Id. at 112-13.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 113.
94. Id. at 116.
95. Id. at 115.
96. Id. at 114.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 114-15.
99. Id. at 115.
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Such deference to the political branches and their independent constitu-
tion-interpreting authority continues to define contemporary RAC jurispru-
dence. Though written nearly a century later and after significant changes in
governmental context, the Second Circuit's 1962 opinion in United States v.
Allocco" is striking for how much it echoes the deferential reasoning in Farrow.
President Dwight Eisenhower failed to nominate anyone to fill a judicial vacan-
cy that opened on July 31, 1955, in the two remaining days before the Senate's
recess began. Two weeks later, with the Senate on a recess that was to last until
January, Eisenhower made a recess appointment of John Cashin to fill the va-
cancy."o' Allocco was one of the first cases decided in Cashin's courtroom.
Appealing from his conviction to the Second Circuit, the defendant argued that
Cashin was "not constitutionally empowered to preside over the trial."o2 As in
Farrow, the appellant argued that because the vacancy had arisen while the
Senate was still in session, rather than during the recess, the President had
exceeded the bounds of his recess appointments power.
The Second Circuit rejected the appeal. As in Farrow, the court found the
originalist evidence to be indeterminate, and once again fell back on deference
to the political branches. The court leaned heavily on both of the political
branches' interpretations of the Clause, pointing to fifty judges currently sitting
under recess appointments,"o3 a "long and continuous line of opinions" from
Attorneys General,10 4 and the fact that "Congress has implicitly recognized the
President's power to fill vacancies which arise when the Senate is in by authoriz-
ing payment of salaries to most persons so appointed under the recess pow-
er." 05 Lacking a determinate mandate from the original meaning of the RAC,
the Second Circuit declined to intervene.
From Farrow to Allocco to Evans, courts have embraced a minimalist judi-
cial method when adjudicating the RAC. Only one modern court has departed
from this approach.o6 In United States v. Woodley (Woodley I),07 a Ninth
Circuit panel renounced Farrow-style deference and ruled that the President
lacked authority to make recess appointments of Article III judges. In February
1980, President Carter nominated Walter Heen to a vacancy on the District
Court of Hawaii. Ten months later, Carter had lost his reelection campaign, and
100. 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962).
lo. Id. at 705.
1o2. Id.
103. Id. at 709.
104. Id. at 713 (quoting i Op. Att'y Gen. 631, 633 (1823) and citing more than a dozen
subsequent Attorney General Opinions).
105. Id. at 714.
106. Only one lower court case also did the same. See In re Dist. Att'y of United States,
7 F. Cas. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1868) (No. 3924).
107. 726 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Heen's nomination languished in the Judiciary Committee.os When the Senate
went on intersession recess, the lame-duck President gave Heen a December 31
recess appointment. After taking office in January 1981, President Reagan quick-
ly withdrew Heen's nomination from the Senate.!o9 The recess commission itself
could not be retracted, however, leaving Heen in an unusual posture: With no
chance of confirmation, he was an Article III judge with a one-year term.
The Woodley I panel raised the RAC issue sua sponte." Judge William
Albert Norris"' found that Heen's recess appointment violated Article III.
Recess appointed federal judges lacked the protections of life tenure and undi-
minished pay."' These judges were asked to decide cases with Senate confirma-
tion hearings hovering in the near future, with their careers hanging in the bal-
ance. Acknowledging the history of judicial recess appointments and apparent
legislative acquiescence, the Woodley I court insisted that no amount of histori-
cal evidence outweighs the Constitution."' Rejecting deference, the court re-
sponded to the Allocco and Farrow courts' reliance on executive constitutional
interpretation with a reassertion of judicial supremacy: "While the members of
both the legislative and executive branches are sworn to uphold the Constitu-
tion, the courts alone are the final arbiters of its meaning."n 4
Woodley Is departure from deferential precedents is also an implicit appli-
cation of the dynamic method of the removal cases. The appointments process
had changed dramatically over the late twentieth century, even since the opi-
nion in Allocco. President Reagan was surely not the first President to use the
judicial appointments power as an instrument to realize a political vision, but
he streamlined and systematized the process in unprecedented ways. By 1983,
when Woodley I was decided, Reagan had already begun using appointments to
the federal judiciary as an arm of his political agenda. Judicial politics were in
1o8. Id. at 1329-30.
109. Id.
1no. Id.
in. Norris was nominated by President Jimmy Carter on February 27, 1980, con-
firmed by the Senate on June 18, 1980, and received his commission on June 18,
1980. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (search for "Norris, Wil-
liam").
112. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § i ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.").
113. 726 F.2d at 1338 ("Historical acceptance and governmental efficiency are not un-
important. They will not, however, 'save [a practice] if it is contrary to the Consti-
tution."' (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983))).
114. Id. at 1336 (citing United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); Marbury v.
Madison 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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transition, and the nomination of judges became a focal point of political
battles. Later, Senate hostility and obstructionism to this agenda would culmi-
nate in the infamous Robert Bork Supreme Court confirmation hearings."' The
Woodley I court's rejection of deference to the executive can be interpreted as a
kind of covert recognition that judicial appointments were not what they used
to be, and so the courts' previous rulings on the issue required reexamination.
The safe harbor of Article III principles was a badly needed refuge.
The governmental context had changed since the Allocco court claimed that
it had no reason to believe that the RAC might be abused."' The Woodley I pan-
el criticized Allocco's statement that "the evils of legislative and executive coer-
cion which petitioner foresees have no support in our nation's history.""7 Such
naIveti was not only inaccurate in the increasingly politicized appointments
context, but, the Woodley I panel argued, also out of tune with the Constitution
itself, since the Framers were "profoundly influenced by the sorry history of a
colonial judiciary which lacked the most basic requisites of judicial indepen-
dence.""'
However, this implicitly context-sensitive method was short-lived. In Unit-
ed States v. Woodley (Woodley II), the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed
the Woodley I panel. The opinion by newly minted Reagan appointee Robert
Beezer"9 returned to Allocco- and Farrow-style deference. 2 o Finding no unequi-
vocal originalist support for an intervention, the Ninth Circuit opted for the
minimalist approach, emphasizing a long and robust history of executive prac-
tice and legislative acquiescence. The opinion begins by asking rhetorically
whether "a practice followed by the Executive for nearly 200 years" was consti-
tutional-the answer, of course, was yes."' Recess appointments of Article III
115. Notably, Senator Robert Dole suggested that the President should grant Bork a
recess appointment. See David Lauter, Reagan Could Put Bork on Court, Dole
Asserts, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1987, at 14.
116. Woodley 1, 726 F.2d at 1339 (criticizing the Allocco court's reasoning); see also Unit-
ed States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 714 (2d Cir. 1962) (rejecting the appellant's claim
that the broad construction of the RAC opened it up to executive abuse, and not-
ing that the court had "not been directed to a single instance of behavior by any
President which might be termed an 'abuse' of the recess power").
117. Woodley I, 726 F.2d at 1339 (quoting Allocco, 305 F.2d at 709).
n8. Id.
11g. Robert R. Beezer was nominated by Reagan on March 2, 1984, confirmed by the
Senate on March 27, 1984, and received his commission on March 28, 1984. See
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc
.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (search for "Beezer, Robert").
120. Woodley II, 751 F.2d ioo8 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
121. Id. at 1009.
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judges, the panel wrote, are "inextricably woven into the fabric of our
nation."...
With the exception of Woodley I, RAC cases have opted for a strategy of
one-step originalism and minimalism. Courts have been reluctant to enter the
political fray over appointments, even as the system has spiraled into greater
dysfunction, threatening core constitutional values.
D. Resolving the Asymmetry in Favor of Translation
It is beyond the scope of this Note to fully address (much less resolve) the
methodological dispute between originalism and translation, or to assess the
relative merits and risks of creativity and minimalism. Nevertheless, there are
good reasons in the context of the RAC to favor resolving the methodological
asymmetry in favor of the translation approach.
1. Originalism Fails To Answer the Question
Originalism is not adequate to resolve the key issue at the heart of the pro
forma sessions dispute. Historians and scholars are split on the fundamental
meaning of the RAC. Professor Michael Rappaport and the dissenting opinion
in Woodley II sketch an original understanding of the RAC as a narrow power.'
But others, such as Professors Edward Hartnett and Michael Herz, have looked
at the same history and found support for a broader understanding.12 4 Such
ambiguity is hardly surprising, since, as I argue below," the Appointments
Clauses embody both action-constraining and action-promoting principles of
the separation of powers. Translation of these competing values into the con-
temporary appointments context is unavoidable.
This confusion is further borne out in the debate over the intertextualist
move that created the pro forma sessions controversy. I discuss this in more de-
tail below,"' but a brief summary here is required. A 1993 U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) brief suggested that for the purposes of the RAC a "recess" must
122. Id. at 1012.
123. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments
Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487 (2005); Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate
in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 2204
(1994); see also Woodley II, 751 F.2d at 1017-20 (Norris, J., dissenting).
124. See Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitu-
tional Questions, 26 CARDOzo L. REV. 377 (2005); Michael Herz, Abandoning Re-
cess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 26 CARDOzo L. REV. 443
(2005).
125. See infra Section II.B.
126. See infra Section IV.A.
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be at least three days long.2 The brief pointed to the Adjournments Clause,
which bars either house of Congress from adjourning for more than three days
without the consent of the other."' According to the DOJ, this Clause
demonstrates that the Framers did not consider one, two, or three day recesses
to be constitutionally significant,2 9 and so recess appointments could be issued
only where the Senate break lasted longer than three days. The Senate's pro
forma sessions rely on this still-reigning executive interpretation-by spacing
sessions out every three days, the Senate prevents a recess from ever formally
occurring.
Many scholars have questioned the validity of the "three-day minimum"
interpretation, arguing that the analogy to the Adjournments Clause and the
interpretation it rests upon are "faulty.""o They are joined by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, which, in Evans v. Stephens, held that "[tihe Constitution, on its face, does
not establish a minimum time that an authorized break in the Senate must last
to give legal force to the President's appointment power under the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause." 3' According to some originalist critics of the modern Pres-
ident's broad use of the recess power, the "recess" of the Senate referred to the
eight or nine month periods during which the Senate was away from Washing-
ton and thus unable (rather than merely unwilling) to provide its advice and
consent.132 Parachuting the three-day requirement from the Adjournments
Clause onto the RAC, critics contend, undermines this version of the original
meaning of the RAC.
Further, some commentators challenged the validity of the pro forma ses-
sions as sessions. One scholar concludes that "[g] aveling open, and then gaveling
closed, a half-minute meeting of an empty chamber is not a legitimate break in
127. HOGUE, supra note 12, at 2 n.9 (citing Memorandum of Points & Authorities in
Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 24-26, Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1993) (Civ. A. No.
93-0032-LFO)). The brief was part of a legal action challenging a lame-duck recess
appointment made by President George H.W. Bush to the U.S. Postal Service
Board. Bush made the appointment during a twelve-day intrasession recess in the
waning days of his administration. Ultimately, the district court rejected the recess
appointment on other grounds, without confronting the boundaries of the Recess
Appointments Clause. See Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D.D.C. 1993)
(noting, with apparent relief, that "[ijn the circumstances here, it is unnecessary
to address the elusive issue of when the Senate is in recess within the meaning of
the Recess Appointments Clause").
128. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
129. VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A LE-
GAL OVERVIEW 9 n.64 (2011) (citing Memorandum of Points & Authorities, supra
note 127, at 24-26).
130. Williams, supra note 6; Lederman, supra note 26.
131. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1225 (ith Cir. 2004).
132. See Rappaport, supra note 123; Carrier, supra note 123.
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the recess.""' Two former high-ranking DOJ officials object that the Senate
"does not meet as a body during a pro forma session" since "no business can be
conducted, and the Senate is not capable of acting on the president's nomi-
nations." Therefore, they conclude, "the Senate remains in 'recess' for purposes
of the recess appointment power, despite the empty formalities of the individual
senators who wield the gavel in pro forma sessions."13 4
But, such interpretations only go so far. The Senate commonly meets for
days, even weeks at a time without doing anything that might be considered
"conducting business." No one would argue that the President could make a
recess appointment during, for instance, an extended filibuster. More deeply,
insofar as the Senate's "business" is balancing against the executive in the sepa-
ration of powers, the pro forma sessions would seem to qualify.
Ultimately, attempts to resolve the pro forma issue that avoid grappling
with the conflicting values embedded in the RAC are unsatisfying. A more ro-
bust engagement with these principles is required.
2. Minimalism's Concern for Protecting the Judiciary Is
Self-Defeating
Even assuming that minimalism's concern with preserving judicial capital
is valid,'35 pursuing this approach by refraining from intervention has proven
self-defeating. Courts have facilitated the seizure of the entire governmental sys-
tem, including the judiciary, by appointments paralysis. As I will argue in more
detail below,1'3 the deterioration of the appointments process has already
exacted severe costs not only on the President's ability to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed, but also on the legislative and judicial branches. Adher-
ing to the minimalist method in order to protect judicial capital only exacer-
bates the appointments paralysis through judicial underreach, and actually di-
minishes the same resources minimalism seeks to protect.
3. A Court May Be Forced To Pick Sides
The deference employed in earlier RAC cases may no longer be as available,
or attractive, in the pro forma sessions conflict that may come. Judicial abnega-
tion has successfully resolved previous conflicts only where the Senate had not
itself taken any direct, official action against the executive's recess power. Simp-
ly by deferring, a court could resolve the case in favor of the executive without
undercutting the Senate in its official capacity. Now that the Senate has sparked
133. Williams, supra note 6.
134. Bradbury & Elwood, supra note 14.
135. But see supra Section L.A (questioning this concept).
136. See infra Part III.
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a direct interbranch conflict by instituting pro forma sessions, a court may be
forced to choose sides.
4. Textual Asymmetry Mandates More Judicial Creativity in Recess
Appointments Clause Cases than in Removal Cases
However little the Constitution says about the contours of recess appoint-
ments, it says even less about the President's removal power. But, this textual
asymmetry supports a methodological asymmetry in the opposite direction of
the current one. Less originalist support-whether in text, meaning, or pur-
pose-should lead a capital-conserving court to less active judicial intervention.
The creativity involved in translation is not the same as the unbounded
norm-generation of common law, but is guided by text, original principles, and
contemporary context.3 7 The RAC embodies the kind of competing principles
that mandate creative judicial balancing and translation. The crystallization of
these values in the constitutional text points toward a more robust judicial en-
gagement in the appointments context than in the removal one-exactly the
opposite of the current regime.
5. Counterargument
It might be argued that this asymmetry is not as well defined as I have sug-
gested. Reference to the practice and interpretation of the executive and legisla-
tive branches is common in the RAC cases, which reflects consideration of con-
temporary context-a touchstone of the translation approach.
Such consultation, however, is not part of judicial interpretation under the
translation method, but serves as a justification to avoid interpretation altogeth-
er. Asking how the executive interprets the RAC is part of contemporary con-
text analysis, but it does not substitute for an independent judicial assessment
of whether that interpretation is proper in light of the principles of the Clause
or other contextual factors. In RAC cases, the courts' reliance on Attorney Gen-
eral opinions and executive practice does not mitigate the asymmetry between
these lines of cases.
Some RAC cases do hint at a more deeply contextualist and principled ap-
proach. One court rejected the challengers' narrow interpretation and noted
that it "would create Executive paralysis and do violence to the orderly func-
tioning of our complex government."13' Another suggested that the RAC's pur-
pose was "to assure the President the capacity for filling vacancies at any time to
keep the Government running smoothly." 39 Further, the Woodley II court re-
jected the narrow interpretation offered by the challengers because it
"attribute [d] to the Framers an intent to create ... a potentially dangerous situ-
137. See supra note 79.
138. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 712 (2d Cir. 1962).
139. Woodley II, 751 F.2d ioo8, 1013 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ation" in which appointments were left unfilled for long periods of time.14o
Finally, a court held that "the main purpose of the Recess Appointments
Clause" was "to enable the President to fill vacancies to assure the proper func-
tioning of our government."'41
But, these hints at symmetry with the removal cases have been the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Courts cite contemporary context evidence to bolster
deferential, credibility-conserving decisions. Even to the extent that the recess
appointments cases do embrace the dynamic, flexible approach of the removal
cases, this Note argues that this feature should be developed further in the
potential pro forma sessions dispute to come.
II. ORIGINAL PRINCIPLE: EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
The remainder of this Note applies the translation method to argue that
courts should find the pro forma sessions constitutionally invalid. This Part
begins to lay the groundwork for the translation approach by articulating the
values embodied in the RAC.
A. The Value of Effective Governance in the Separation of Powers
Americans are accustomed to viewing their Constitution primarily as a
constraint on government. The separation of powers is a system of "checks and
balances," constraining the actions of the various branches. The Bill of Rights is
a series of "thou shalt not" restrictions against the government. Even the
Constitution's power-granting provisions are only permissive: "Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,"14' but if
Congress decides not to, the Constitution does not appear to object.
The Constitution also speaks in the imperative. It does not merely grant
powers to be exercised if desired, it also maps out a set of duties that must be
obeyed. Thus, "[t]he President ... shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted."' 43 "Taking care" is the affirmative responsibility of a person who "shall
be elected" to that office."
Although the concept of checks and balances predominates in the
popular imagination,145 the Constitution balances action-promoting and
140. Id.
141. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F. 3 d 1220, 1226 (n1th Cir. 2004).
142. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
143. U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 3, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
144. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § i, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
145. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 50, at 359 ("[Wlorried about concentration and abuse
of political power, the Founders sought to minimize the risk of government
overreaching.... Even as the world has changed dramatically, the fears of the
Founders continue to guide our thinking.").
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action-constraining principles. The Framers designed a system to avoid not
only the governmental overreaches of monarchy, but also the underreaches of
the failed Articles of Confederation. That these conflicting principles are embo-
died in the Constitution should not come as a surprise.
Courts and scholars have acknowledged an action-promoting principle
embedded in the Constitution. Justice Jackson perceived that "the Constitu-
tion ... contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government.'"146 More recently, Benjamin Ewing and Professor
Douglas Kysar urged a reconsideration of the separation of powers. They write
that, beyond checks and balances, "the constitutional division of authority also
may be seen as a system of 'prods and pleas' in which distinct governmental
branches and actors can push each other to entertain collective political action
when necessary."1 47 Respect for this action-promoting principle is especially
needed now, Ewing and Kysar argue, as threats such as climate change and ter-
rorism pose risks of unlimited harm which can only be addressed if our gov-
ernment moves beyond its exclusively action-constraining vision. Our society's
"preference for passivity"148 and hostility toward active government has become
a "dangerously double-edged sword in some significant areas of law and policy,
where threats to social welfare arise in substantial part from the nature of
limited government itself." 49
Commentators and politicians on both the left and the right have long
sounded the alarm about the consolidation of powers in the federal govern-
ment, particularly in the executive branch.'o But, as Ewing and Kysar urge,
"[l]iberal anxiety today should focus not just on whether our system of checks
and balances can safely constrain collective political action, but also on whether
the system can ensure that collective action does happen when it is necessary." 51
Perhaps no area of government is in more need of an action-promoting revival
than the appointments system.
146. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
147. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 50, at 350.
148. Id. at 353 (quoting Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, Law and Economics for a
Warming World, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 335 (2007)).
149. Id.; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Im-
prove the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007).
Iso. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2010); Koppelman, supra note 51, at 17-20 (addressing the infamous "broccoli"
argument against health care reform's constitutionality).
151. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 50, at 357.
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B. The Value of Effective Governance in the Appointments Clauses
This action-promoting principle is particularly embodied in the RAC. The
Constitution provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States ....
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.151
The general appointments power, conditioned upon receipt of the "advice and
consent of the Senate," embodies the action-inhibiting checks and balances
principle: The Senate provides a check on the executive's authority to appoint,
thereby restraining any monarchial tendencies through mediation and
interbranch dialogue. The RAC follows that check, deliberately carving out an
exception to enable the continued operations of government. Read together, the
Appointments Clauses embody a balance between action-constraining and
action-promoting principles.
Various authorities converge on this interpretation of the RAC. Alexander
Hamilton characterized the Clause as "nothing more than a supplement ... for
the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to
which the general method was inadequate."5 3 Justice Story wrote that the RAC
serves "convenience, promptitude of action, and general security." 54 Professor
Hartnett demonstrated that this understanding of the RAC was its original
meaning.'5
Some commentators advanced a narrower reading of the RAC." 6 The
Clause, as originally understood, allowed the President to "fill vacancies that
occurred during the long intersession recesses when the Senate, with its mem-
bers dispersed throughout the country, could not readily reconvene to provide
its advice and consent.""' On this view, the RAC does provide a "supplementa-
ry procedure," but was "adopted without any intent to supplant the Senate's
constitutional role."'18 It provided a way around the usual appointment proce-
152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 389 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA ed., 2009).
154. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1551 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed., 1999) (1833) (emphasis added).
155. Hartnett, supra note 124; see also Michael Herz, supra note 124.
156. See Steven M. Pyser, Recess Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: An Unconstitu-
tional Transformation of Senate Advice and Consent, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61, 64
(20o6); Rappaport, supra note 123; Carrier, supra note 123.
157. Carrier, supra note 123, at 2224-25.
158. Pyser, supra note 156, at 64.
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dures only when the Senate was unable, not merely unwilling, to perform its
constitutional "advice and consent" function. For the first hundred years of the
Republic, the Clause served an important function: Congress was in session for
less than half the year and recessed for as long as nine months at a time.' 9 On
today's congressional calendar, the powers granted under the Clause have been
rendered essentially moot by the changed governmental context.
The objection raised by these scholars is driven by methodological rather
than historical reasoning. They dispute the appropriate level of abstraction
to interpret the Clause, without denying that the RAC was intended to
promote the executive's ability to continue the activities of government. The
disagreement is about when, as Hamilton put it, the "general method was
inadequate," 6 0 thus meriting recourse to the supplementary method. The nar-
rower reading does not reject the principle of effective governance; it only
rejects its abstraction away from the circumstances of the eighteenth century to
those of the twenty-first.
III. MODERN CONTEXT: RECESS APPOINTMENTS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL SAFETY
VALVE
This Part continues and completes the groundwork for the use of transla-
tion by surveying the modern appointments landscape and the safety valve
function served by recess appointments.
A. Modern Appointments Paralysis
Even as the size and scope of the federal government has continued to
expand, presidential appointments have failed to keep pace, producing alarm-
ing rates of vacancies. From 1979 until 2003, executive agency positions were va-
cant an average of 25% of the time.'' After one year in office, President Obama
had filled just 64.4% of Senate-confirmed executive agency positions-the worst
showing of any of the past five administrations.16 2 The Senate took an average of
60.8 days to confirm Obama's nominees in the first year, longer than Bush II
(57-9), Clinton (48.9), or Bush I (51.5) .,6 As of March 2010, Obama had 217
159. T.J. Halstead, Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview, in RECESS APPOINTMENTS:
AN END-AROUND PRACTICE 1, 3 (Chambers Y. Nells ed., 20o6).
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 389 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA ed., 2009).
161. O'Connell, Vacant, supra note 9, at 962.
162. O'CONNELL, WAITING, supra note 9, at 2 (Reagan had 86.4%, Bush I had 80.1%,
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nominees pending in the Senate, who had been pending an average of ioi days,
including 34 nominees pending more than 6 months.6 4
The problem extends to the federal courts. The Judicial Conference of the
United States coined the term "judicial emergencies" to draw congressional and
executive attention to vacancies in the courts that faced particularly severe
docket problems.'' The Federal Bar Association reports that "[t he judicial
vacancies problem has reached [a] crisis point with more than one-third of the
current 103 vacancies in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the District Courts hav-
ing existed for at least 18 months."'6 6 President Carter enjoyed a confirmation
rate of 92% for his circuit court nominees; Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had
historically low rates of 71% and 74%."' The average time that lower court judi-
cial nominees are awaiting confirmation has lengthened even as the rate of con-
firmation has decreased."' Between 1945 and 1980, the Senate took usually one,
rarely two, and almost never more than three months to move from nomi-
nation to confirmation for lower court nominees."' Beginning with the iooth
Congress (1987-1988), lower court nominees took an average of roughly six
months to be confirmed. Since then, the timeline has only extended.o
These vacancies are a heavy burden on effective governance. Professor
Anne Joseph O'Connell suggests that "vacancies promote agency inaction,""'
and "[a]gencies without confirmed officials in key roles will be less likely to
address important problems and less equipped to handle crises." 72
Recently, the Republican Senate minority utilized appointments obstruc-
tion as a quasi-legislative power to obstruct the enforcement of a disfavored
law. The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill authorized the creation of the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Bureau was a key bargaining chip in
the closely contested negotiation of the bill. Its ultimate form was a compro-
164. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appoint-
ments to Key Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administra
tion-positions.
165. Judicial Emergencies, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndjudgeships/
JudicialVacancies/JudicialEmergencies.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
166. Judicial Vacancies Fact Sheet, FED. B. AsS'N, http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/
Judicial-Vacancies/Fact-Sheet.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
167. BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN
ANGRY TIMES 38-39 (2006).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 39 (noting that "[d]uring the course of the Bush administration through
April 7, 2oo6, it has taken, on average, 394 days to confirm a circuit court judge
and 162 days to confirm a district court judge").
171. O'Connell, Vacant, supra note 9, at 920.
172. Id.; see also O'CONNELL, WAITING, supra note 9, at n1.
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mise-neither the fully independent agency some Democrats favored, nor re-
moved entirely from the bill as some Republicans favored."1 After the 2010 elec-
tions, the Republican minority wielded an effective one-house, legislative,
line-item veto over the Agency by indefinitely stalling the confirmation of any-
one nominated to lead it. Forty-four Republican senators signed a letter pledg-
ing to block not just Professor Elizabeth Warren, who was rumored to be Ob-
ama's likely choice to lead the Agency, but also any other nominee for
the director position until Democrats agreed to major reductions in
the Agency's power.17 4 Now that the President has nominated former Ohio
Attorney General Richard Cordray to lead the agency,'75 Republicans have kept
their promise."76
This method of obstruction does not only deal a political blow to President
Obama and other Democrats who favor an activist Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau, it also undermines the institutional values of the legislative branch.
The Republican minority undermined the legislative bargaining process by
demanding further concessions after enactment. Legislative compromise be-
comes more difficult when assurances are valid only until the next election
cycle, when either side may renege on commitments and extract additional
concessions through appointments obstruction. The Republican minority has
wielded its "Advice and Consent" role as a quasi-legislative power, achieving
through obstruction what it could not through the constitutionally required
procedures of bicameralism and presentment.'"
Institutional developments may explain how the appointments system
reached this level of dysfunction. The expansion of the federal bureaucracy has
created more Senate-confirmed positions, which creates more potential for
conflict and delay. Professor Michael Gerhardt observes that "far more presi-
dential nominations are [now] potentially available for senators to oppose."'
173. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1964 (2010).
174. Edward Wyatt, Hearing over a Consumer Bureau Descends into Sharp Accusations,
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at 31.
175. Binyamin Appelbaum, Former Ohio Attorney General To Head New Consumer
Agency, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at Bi.
176. In December 2011, the Senate Republican majority blocked Cordray's nomination.
Republican Senator Orrin Hatch explained that the Republican obstructionism
was "not about the nominee, who appears to be a decent person and may very
well be qualified." John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Stops Consumer Nominee, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at Bi. Instead, as Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell
stated, Republicans "won't support a nominee for this bureau-regardless of who
the president is." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (ruling that the one-house legisla-
tive veto is unconstitutional).
178. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 61-62 (2003).
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But, it also means that the President is responsible for finding, vetting, nomi-
nating, coaching, and replacing more nominees. Though the Senate is the usual
target for appointments complaints, lag times between vacancies and nomi-
nations have also been growing, which suggests that the presidency bears
responsibility as well.179
Changing norms and practices of the Senate have also altered appointments
and confirmation practice. Observers point to a decline in Senate "collegiali-
ty."Is Rising individualism and declining norms of reciprocity in the latter part
of the twentieth century have led existing rules to acquire new potency.'' The
Seventeenth Amendment, passed in 1913, made senators directly elected by vot-
ers rather than appointed by state legislatures, and it has been cited as an
important facilitator of these institutional changes."'
Various obstructionist maneuvers have proliferated. Most famously, the
filibuster has become a default supermajority requirement for every appoint-
ment.' Secret and public "holds"'8 4 have proliferated since Senator Jesse Helms
179. See O'Connell, Vacant, supra note 9, at 35; see also Jonathan Bernstein, Empty
Bench Syndrome, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2011, at A27 (criticizing the Obama adminis-
tration for long delays in getting judicial nominees to the Senate, and for failing to
use the "bully pulpit" to promote these nominees once they got there, and noting
that "unless the president speaks up about a relatively thankless task like getting
nominations approved, his party's senators are likely to focus on issues with
greater political benefits").
180. GERHARDT, supra note 178, at 66 (noting that various procedural changes "helped
to change the Senate from a collegial body to one dominated by individuals with
separate agendas").
181. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,
220 (1997).
182. GERHARDT, supra note 178, at 65-66 ("One obvious effect of the Seventeenth
Amendment has been to make the Senate's constitutionally imposed duties, such
as the confirmation of presidential nominees, subject to electoral review, com-
ment, and reprisal.").
183. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CON-
GRESS Is FAILING AMERICA AND How To GET IT BACK ON TRACK 162-69 (2006)
(describing the use of the filibuster by senators to stall President George W.
Bush's judicial nominees as key evidence of institutional decline in the Senate); see
also SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, BROOKINGS INST., POLITICS OR PRIN-
CIPLE: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1996) (finding that filibus-
ters had gone from an average of one per Congress in the 1950s to thirty-five in
the 1991-92 Congress); Ezra Klein, A Productive Congress Doesn't Weaken the Case
for Filibuster Reform, WASH. PosT's WONKBLOG (Dec. 23, 2010, 9:oo AM), http://
voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/12/filibusterdraft.html (including a
chart that shows the precipitous rise in cloture filings over the last ten Congresses
as a proxy for the increasing salience of filibuster).
184. A "hold" is "[a]n informal practice by which a Senator informs his or her floor
leader that he or she does not wish a particular bill or other measure to reach the
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"held" all of President Clinton's nominees for a North Carolina seat on the
Fourth Circuit for six years. President Clinton ultimately filled the post with a
recess appointment of a lawyer from another state.'81 Senator Ron Wyden
utilized other maneuvers, including the two-hour rule,'" to block Senate con-
firmation of two Bush appointees to the FTC.8 7 President Bush subsequently
gave recess appointments to both."'S Most recently, using a combination of
holds and a tactic called "tracking," 8 9 Senator Richard Shelby delayed the con-
firmation of seventy Obama nominations in order to obtain leverage to gain
special funding for home-state projects.'9 o Obama gave recess appointments to
several of these nominees.
The appointments process at the beginning of the twenty-first century is far
from what was envisioned by the Framers. While there was surely no "golden
age" of appointments, institutional developments have produced a modern ap-
pointments regime that threatens to paralyze effective government in unprece-
dented ways. The next Section examines the role played by recess appointments
in this regime.
B. Recess Appointments as a Constitutional Safety Valve
Recess appointments are a vital mechanism to preserving the effective en-
forcement of the laws in the face of escalating appointments paralysis. They
have taken on a distinct role in the separation of powers as a constitutional safe-
ty valve against growing Senate obstruction. The examples provided above of
the appointments maneuvers utilized by Senators Helms, Wyden, and Shelby
each ended in recess appointments by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama,
floor for consideration." Glossary, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossaryterm/hold.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). "The Majority Leader need not
follow the Senator's wishes, but is on notice that the opposing Senator may fili-
buster any motion to proceed to consider the measure." Id.
185. Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments
Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1711 (2001). The judge was Roger Gregory. Id.
186. The two-hour rule can "force an end to a committee meeting that has lasted long-
er than two hours when the Senate is in session." James O'Connell, A Brief Look at
Recess Appointments, ANTITRUST SOURCE (ABA, Chi.), Sept. 2004, at 1.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. "Tracking," also called the "dual-track system," allows "the majority leader-with
the unanimous consent of the Senate or the approval of the minority leader-to
set aside whatever [is] being debated on the Senate floor and move immediately to
another item on the agenda." Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, Op-Ed., A
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respectively. These incidents are typical of the safety-valve function that recess
appointments play in the contemporary appointments regime.
As delays in confirmations have grown, Presidents have begun to make
recess appointments during progressively shorter recesses. A 2008 Congression-
al Research Service report noted that "[i]t has become commonplace for Presi-
dents to make recess appointments during recesses of less than 30 days."' 9 ' Rea-
gan made a recess appointment to the NLRB during a ten-day intersession
recess.'9 Clinton made one during a nine-day intrasession recess.'93 Political
scientists have demonstrated that Presidents use the recess power in a condi-
tionally strategic manner: when the expected policy benefits outweigh the
expected political costs.' 94 This finding supports the thesis that recess appoint-
ments have a safety-valve function: They permit Presidents to make a calcula-
tion that a particular appointment or set of appointments is needed and well
worth the consequences of the political backlash that it may inspire.
Perhaps the most compelling demonstrations of the safety-valve function of
recess appointments are the institutional harms that occur when the valve is
blocked by the pro forma sessions. In New Process Steel v. NLRB,'95 the Court
invalidated twenty-seven months of National Labor Relations Board opinions
because the NLRB had been operating without the three-member quorum
mandated under the statute. The quorum failure was a direct result of the pro
forma sessions.'9 Senator Reid initiated the pro forma blockade for the first
time in late 2007, just as the five-member board shrank to four upon the expira-
tion of one board member's term.'97 Two of the remaining four members were
recess appointees whose terms were set to expire at the end of that year.'9' With
no new confirmations expected,'99 and with the recess power effectively
191. HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 4, at 5.
192. Id. (citing Digest of Other White House Announcements, 18 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1662 (Dec. 23, 1982)).
193. Id. at 6 (citing Digest of Other White House Announcements, 32 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 980 (May 31, 1996)).
194. See Pamela C. Corley, Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential
Power, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 670, 678 (20o6); Scott E. Graves & Robert M.
Howard, Ignoring Advice and Consent? The Uses offudicial Recess Appointments, 63
POL. RES. Q. 640 (2010).
195. 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
196. Id. at 2638.
197. Id.
198. Members of the NLRB Since 1935, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/
members-nlrb-1935 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
199. As a 2010 Washington Post article explained: "The board worked with only two
members for more than two years because Democrats blocked President Bush's
nominees on complaints that they were biased in favor of business. Then Republi-
cans blocked President Obama's nominees, complaining that they were biased in
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blocked, outgoing board members attempted to circumvent the statutory quo-
rum requirement by vesting authority in the two-member board.2 0 0 As the
Board's then-chairman Wilma B. Liebman explained, "We thought we were
doing the right thing to keep the agency running."2 0 1 The remaining two mem-
bers-one Republican and one Democrat-wielded their authority conserva-
tively, declining to rule on approximately sixty cases that would have set new
precedents.2 0 2 The NLRB relied on the legal advice of the top legal authority in
the executive branch, the Office of Legal Counsel, in making this two-member
gambit.2 0 3 Before it got to the Supreme Court, several circuit courts affirmed the
move, holding that the two-member board had the authority to continue.20 4
The Supreme Court held that the two-member board lacked statutory authority
to decide any cases during this period, and invalidated all of the roughly six
hundred decisions.2 5
New Process Steel marks a new low point in the appointments gridlock. No
branch escapes lasting institutional harm from this paralysis. Most obviously,
the executive loses its ability to guide an independent agency's enforcement (or
non-enforcement) of the laws. Congress's institutional values are also impli-
cated, since this appointments obstruction amounts to a one-house legislative
veto over a previously enacted statute. In the NLRB context, by blocking recess
appointments, Congress effectively deprived the Board of its statutory authority
to "prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting
favor of union interests." Peter Whoriskey & Sonja Ryst, National Labor Relations
Board Decisions Were Illegal, Supreme Court Rules, WASH. PosT (June 18, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2oo/o6/17/AR2o0oo6175685
2.html.
2oo. New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2638.
201. Whoriskey & Ryst, supra note i9 (quoting Liebman) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
202. Id.
203. Quorum Requirements, 27 Op. O.L.C., 2003 WL 24166831, at *1 (Mar. 4, 2003); see
also New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2638 ("The Board's minutes explain that it re-
lied on ... an opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), for the propo-
sition that the Board may. .. 'issue decisions during periods when three or more
of the five seats on the Board are vacant."'); id. at 2650 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("In 2003, the Office of Legal Counsel advised that two members can operate as a
quorum of a properly designated group, even if the other seats on the Board are
vacant.").
204. See, e.g., Narricot Indus. v. NLRB, 587 F3d 654 (4th Cir. 2010); Northeastern Land
Servs. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (ist Cir. 2009); Snell Island SNF v. NLRB, 568 F.3d
410, 424 (2d Cir. 2009).
205. New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2644.
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commerce '2o' for two years without going to the trouble of repealing the sta-
tute."o7 This undermines the legislative compromise behind the agency's
implementing statute and sets a destabilizing precedent for future legislative
bargains.
The judiciary suffers institutional harms as well. As of the time of the New
Process Steel ruling, ninety-six of the invalidated NLRB decisions were on appeal
in the federal courts: six at the Supreme Court and ninety in various courts of
appeals.20s Dozens of these cases have now returned to the Board for new con-
sideration, after which a new round of appeals in the courts will likely begin.2 o9
The scarce judicial resources expended on the now-rescinded cases were wasted,
since many cases must now be relitigated."o
But, more than any governmental actor, it is the parties involved in these
invalidated cases, as well as those third parties who are dependent on their re-
sults, who bear the brunt of the costs here.2 n Countless workers, unions,
businesses, and investors who depend on the NLRB have had their expectations
upended.
At high cost to all three branches of government, and especially to the citi-
zens who depend on the government's effective operation, appointments para-
lysis reached a new low in New Process Steel. Yet, the Court did not seize the op-
portunity to address the pro forma sessions that precipitated the quorum failure
that was really at the center of the case. If and when the Court has the opportu-
nity to address the pro forma sessions, New Process Steel should be used as
"Exhibit A" for the safety-valve function that recess appointments have come to
play in the paralytic appointments regime.
IV. PRESERVING THE APPOINTMENTS SAFETY VALVE
Under the translation method of interpretation, pro forma sessions should
be rejected as an unconstitutional burden on the President's ability to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. This Part brings together the threads of the
2o6. 29 U.S.C. § 16o(a) (2oo6).
207. Under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), this de facto legislative veto power
might itself provide a reason to hold these sessions unconstitutional.
208. See Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Outlines Plans for Considering 2-Member Cases
in Wake of Supreme Court Ruling (July 1, 2010), http://www.1rionline.com/
wp-content/uploads/R-2762.pdf.
209. See Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Issues First Decisions Involving Returned
Two Member Cases (Aug. 5, 2010), http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d458038ea81.
210. See id. Updated information on the status of these cases is available at https://
www.nlrb.gov/news-media/backgrounders/background-materials-two-member
-board-decisions.
211. Press Release, NLRB, supra note 209.
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underlying principle of the RAC with the modern appointments context
discussed in the previous two Parts. Before proceeding with this analysis, it will
be useful to provide some more detail on the pro forma sessions themselves,
and how this hypothetical challenge to these sessions might arrive before a
court.
A. The Facts
Unlimited by judicial boundaries, the political branches have engaged in a
series of maneuvers, repeatedly outflanking one another and culminating in the
deployment of the pro forma sessions. This Section reviews those maneuvers.
1. The Executive's Three-Day Minimum Interpretation
In a 1993 DOJ brief in Mackie v. Clinton, executive branch lawyers suggested
that a recess of the Senate for the purposes of the RAC must be at least three
days long.m' The case was the first to raise the RAC question after the Woodley I
panel stripped the executive of its power to make judicial recess
appointments. 13 The Mackie brief pointed to Article I, Section 5 of the Consti-
tution, which bars either house of Congress from adjourning for more than
three days without the consent of the other. This demonstrates that the
Framers did not consider one, two, or three day recesses to be constitutionally
significant.2 14 Thus, the DOJ argued, recess appointments could only be made
where the recess lasted longer than three days.
The Mackie brief may have been a reaction to the threat of judicial review
announced in the Woodley I case. By prescribing a limit on the recess power, the
executive signaled a commitment to exercise its power within some defined
limits in order to assuage judicial anxieties about a potentially boundless recess
power. By providing a strong textual limit on its own authority, the executive
may have sought to preempt a less favorable judicially constructed rule. 15 Pro-
fessor Marty Lederman suggests that this three-day minimum was designed "to
distract courts and others from the absurd ramification of [the executive's] ac-
tual legal argument, which is that the President may make recess appointments
every weekend, indeed, every night."216
212. HOGUE, supra note 12, at 2 n.9 (citing Memorandum of Points & Authorities,
supra note 127, at 24-26); see also supra note 127 (discussing the background of the
case).
213. See Woodley I, 726 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en banc, 751 F.2d 1008 (1985).
214. CHU, supra note 129, at 9 n.64.
215. See supra Section I.B.
216. Lederman, supra note 26.
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The executive has continued to promote this three-day minimum position
in subsequent briefs and opinions.2 1 7 In its brief in Evans v. Stephens, the DOJ
referred to recesses shorter than three days as "de minimis"-i.e., too small to
be constitutionally recognized."' As of early 2010, the three-day minimum was
still the reigning executive interpretation. Then-Deputy Solicitor General Neal
Katyal, arguing the New Process Steel case before the Supreme Court, reiterated
the position while describing for the Court the current status of the Obama
administration's nominees to the NLRB:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And the recess appointment power
doesn't work why?
MR. KATYAL: The-the recess appointment power can work in-
in a recess. I think our office has opined the recess has to be longer than 3
days. And-and so, it is potentially available to avert the future crisis
that-that could-that could take place with respect to the board.21 9
Unmentioned in this exchange is the fact that the vacancies at the core of the
New Process Steel litigation were occasioned by the pro forma sessions, which
themselves grew out of the three-day minimum interpretation that Katyal
articulated.
2. Senate Pro Forma Sessions
Throughout the George W. Bush administration, Democrats in the Senate
made trouble for the President's nominees. As a consequence, Bush made 171
recess appointments during his first six-and-a-half years in office.22 0 Bush's re-
cess appointments of two appellate judges, Charles W. Pickering to the Fifth
Circuit and William Pryor to the Eleventh, and one diplomat, John Bolton as
Ambassador to the United Nations, attracted the particular ire of the bypassed
Democratic senators and other commentators.
In November 2007, Majority Leader Harry Reid organized individual sena-
tors to hold pro forma sessions every few days over the Thanksgiving break to
prevent the recess appointment of James Holsinger as the new Surgeon Gener-
al.22 ' Democrats were adamantly opposed to his nomination.2 Reid picked up
217. Brief for the Intervenor United States Supporting the Constitutionality of Judge
Pryor's Appointment as a Judge of this Court at 2, Stephens v. Evans (nth Cir.
July 30, 2004) (No. 02-16424) (describing the three-day minimum as a "de mini-
mis" exception); id. at 8 (citing congressional rules to the same effect); id. at 29-30
(citing U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 5, cl. 4).
218. Id. at 2; see also supra Section I.C.
219. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635
(20o) (No. 08-1457) (emphasis added).
220. See HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 4, at 2.
221. See sources cited supra notes 2-3.
222. See Harris, supra note 3, at A15.
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on the executive's three-day minimum interpretation, crafted more than a dec-
ade earlier by the DOJ in the Mackie case, and scheduled pro forma sessions to
prevent the executive's own constitutional timer from expiring. The pro forma
sessions succeeded; Bush never attempted the appointment. Democrats contin-
ued the practice over the remainder of the Bush administration, and prevented
the President from making any additional recess appointments.
But the Democrats were soon beaten at their own game. In mid-2010, after
the Democrats lost their filibuster-proof majority, Obama's nominations were
delayed, held, and otherwise scuttled at a high rate.2" Approaching the midterm
elections, Republicans threatened to "send back" Obama's nominees, which
would force Senate committees to restart all confirmation processes, imposing
substantial delays. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell exploited this vul-
nerability, threatening to "send Obama's most controversial nominees back to
the President if Democrats did not agree to schedule pro forma sessions."22 4
Democrats capitulated and initiated the pro forma sessions against their own
party's President. Again, the maneuver was effective: Obama made no recess
appointments. And, again, Republicans repeated the maneuver.2 25 What Reid
had created to undermine a Republican President had been transformed into an
extractable concession by the minority party.
B. Procedural Posture
Given their proven effectiveness against Presidents Bush and Obama, and
as implemented by both majority and minority parties in the Senate, the pro
forma sessions seem likely to become a steady fixture in the appointments
regime. Or, to put it more ominously, they "threaten[] to become a permanent
roadblock in the already dysfunctional appointments process."226 Future Presi-
dents may be deprived of their power to make recess appointments, including
in moments where they most need them. In ordinary circumstances, Presidents
seem likely to follow the examples set by Bush and Obama (so far) and wait out,
rather than directly challenge, the pro forma sessions. However, a political
crisis-some event demanding strong and swift executive action-could force a
President to "call the Senate's bluff." Imagine, for instance, the following
scenario:
A large number of early resignations and preexisting vacancies leave the
National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration without any high-
level political leadership. The President nominates a new Administrator
223. See supra text accompanying notes 161-164.
224. Alexander Bolton, Senate Blocks Recess Appointments with Deal Between Dems,
GOP, HILL (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.thehill.com/homenews/senate/121775
-senate-blocks-recess-appointments.
225. See sources cited supra note 8.
226. Bradbury & Elwood, supra note 14, at A19.
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but the Senate regards the nominee as unacceptable, vows to block her
confirmation, and arranges for pro forma sessions to block a possible recess
appointment. Suddenly Mini Coopers begin to self-destruct at an extraor-
dinary rate, injuring thousands. The crisis focuses national attention on
the Agency as demands mount for strong federal action. But, the career
bureaucrats running the Agency take only the most conservative, slow-
moving steps. Under pressure, the President gives a recess appointment to
his nominee, notwithstanding the ongoing pro forma sessions.
Assuming that potential plaintiffs find their way over the standing hurdle to
challenge such an appointment in federal court,2 7 a court might be pressed to
reach the merits and decide the constitutionality of these sessions. I have argued
that the Court should apply the flexible, dynamic method adopted in the
removal cases, rather than the minimalist approach of the RAC cases. 228 The
next Section applies this method to the pro forma sessions.
C. Analysis
By blocking off the constitutional safety valve, pro forma sessions constitute
a violation of the action-promoting principle of effective law enforcement em-
bodied in the RAC, and should therefore be struck down as unconstitutional.
As Part II showed, the RAC embodies the action-promoting principle of ef-
fective law enforcement. This principle is balanced by the action-constraining
"check" provided by the Senate's "advice and consent" function. Courts have
the difficult task of determining the threshold at which the protection of one
principle at the expense of another goes too far. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court
found that though such congressional interference implicated executive control,
it was permissible."' Conversely, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Court found that
Congress went too far in constricting the President.2 3o
Locating the threshold point after which intrusion on a principle consti-
tutes a violation is a contextual exercise. Part III above showed that as the ap-
227. A complete discussion of how or whether private parties might obtain Article III
standing to litigate the pro forma sessions issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
Different types of appointments present different issues, and some appointments
may be effectively nonjusticiable. But, the various RAC cases surveyed in Section
I.C do provide several pathways to standing. See, e.g., United States v. Allocco, 305
F.2d 704, 705 (2d Cir. 1962) (a convicted criminal defendant challenging the con-
stitutionality of his trial judge's recess appointment on appeal); In re Farrow, 3 F.
112 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880) (an ousted officer challenging the constitutionality of his
recess-appointed replacement).
228. See supra Section I.D.
229. See 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 65-71 (interpreting
Morrison).
230. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010);
see also supra text accompanying notes 72-76 (interpreting Free Enter. Fund).
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pointments process has marched steadily toward governmental paralysis, recess
appointments have taken on a critical safety-valve function, allowing the Presi-
dent to relieve the pressure of vacancies and delays, and paying the cost in terms
of political backlash. This safety-valve function certainly does not preserve an
optimal level of effective execution of the laws, but rather a minimally necessary
level of enforcement, marking a constitutional threshold point. Depriving the
executive of this last-resort mechanism would effectively erase the RAC-and
the action-promoting principle it stands for-from the Constitution. The ses-
sions skew the separation of powers too far in favor of the power-checking
principle, and neglect the action-promoting principle embedded in the RAC.
Like the two layers of for-cause removal in Free Enterprise Fund, a court should
strike down the pro forma sessions as too great a burden on the President's abil-
ity to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
A court following this removal method would be faced with the
second-order decision faced by courts in the removal cases: whether to follow
cases like Free Enterprise Fund and Humphrey's Executor and adopt a formalistic
rule to guide future practice, or instead to follow Morrison by simply articulat-
ing the competing principles (as in the preceding paragraphs) and going no fur-
ther than announcing this particular ruling. Both approaches are possible here.
A court could follow the formalist suggestion, advanced by various critics
of the pro forma sessions, that the thirty-second sessions cannot be a valid
obstacle to recess appointments because the Senate does not conduct any real
business during those sessions."' Alternatively, a court could announce that
there is no constitutionally designated minimum time for a recess, that the
intertextualist move at the foundation of the three-day minimum interpretation
is not constitutionally justified, and that a President is free to make recess ap-
pointments during any such recess if he is willing to bear the political costs."'
However, it may be more advisable to refrain from announcing any rigid for-
malistic rule that is too determinative in this quickly changing area. Relying
only on balancing principles, though it gives the parties less guidance for their
behavior going forward, has the advantage of retaining more interpretive power
going forward, in case a single ruling is unable to resolve decisively the prison-
er's dilemma of appointments paralysis.
D. An Imperial Presidency?
Some commentators have greeted the arrival of the pro forma sessions with
approval. Blake Denton lauded the pro forma sessions as an end to legislative
acquiescence to the domineering executive's ability to recess appoint Article III
judges: "Congress has made its distaste for Article III recess appointments ex-
231. See Williams, supra note 6; Bradbury & Elwood, supra note 14; Lederman, supra
note 26.
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pressly known.... [Ilt is clear that recess appointments to Article III judgeships
are no longer necessary to serve the public interest." 3 Setting aside the fact that
the pro forma sessions have been implemented to block nominees within the
executive branch, Denton provides an appealing image of a Senate underdog
cleverly turning the executive's own sinister machinations against itself.
The expansion of executive power is a major factor contributing to the de-
terioration of the appointments process. 34 Moreover, the three-day minimum
interpretation may confirm some commonly leveled criticisms against executive
constitutionalism: It seems driven by political and power-based motives rather
than proper constitutional considerations,235 contributes to the growth of an
imperial presidency, and undermines predictability in legal administration.
Yet, a position that supports the pro forma sessions simply because it un-
dermines the growth of executive power fails to take into consideration the im-
pact that the pro forma sessions have on effective governance beyond the execu-
tive. The sessions also burden the legislature's own institutional values, the
judiciary's allocation of its scarce resources, and, most importantly, the people's
interest in effective law enforcement. As New Process Steel demonstrates, these
sessions have already begun to have far-reaching costs on all of these interests.236
The pro forma sessions pose a threat to our government that far outweighs any
victory in the battle against the imperial executive.
V. BEYOND THE SAFETY VALVE?
Even if a court were to reassure the availability of the constitutional safety
valve, the contemporary appointments regime would still seem to fall far short
of any optimal level of law enforcement. The dysfunction extends far beyond
the use of pro forma sessions."' Perhaps, then, a court could justify a broader
intervention into this process. Once the court has discarded the minimalism
that constricted previous RAC cases, it could use this case as an entry point to
remedy the deeper dysfunction of the appointments regime.
Past reform failures by the Senate provide further justification for such in-
tervention. Attempts at reform invariably come from senators of the same party
as the sitting President (who are naturally eager to see appointees get into office
quickly) and are invariably rejected by the minority party (who are reluctant to
give up their obstructionist powers). This pattern suggests a structural and po-
tentially intractable impediment to reform: While each party has expressed
support for reform, parties will not give up their individual advantage when in
the minority. Appointments reform, in other words, is a prisoner's dilemma:
233. Denton, supra note 23, at 776-77.
234. See sources cited supra note 150.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 212-215.
236. See supra Section III.B.
237. See supra Part III.
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All parties would be better off with everyone cooperating, but each party faces
an individual disadvantage from its cooperation. Given the harm that appoint-
ments paralysis does to all three branches and the structural incapacity of
the political branches to agree on reform, courts could justify greater interven-
tion into the appointments crisis thicket beyond striking down the pro forma
sessions.
What form might such intervention take? Various proposals for reform
have been raised from within the Senate chambers.238 In 1995, with Clinton in
office, Democratic Senators Tom Harkin and Joe Lieberman proposed a filibus-
ter phase-out plan for judicial nominations: The first vote for cloture would re-
quire 60 votes, followed by more debate, and then a second vote would require
57, then 55, and on down to a simple majority.2 39 Republican Senator Bill Frist
proposed a similar plan while Bush was in office.2 4o More recently, in early 2011,
Senator Tom Udall led a group of Senate Democrats in proposing reforms.2 41
Outside the Senate, Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued for a reform that
"requires a speedy up-or-down majority vote on executive nominations" but
not judicial ones.'42 The Federal Bar Association proposed a "prompt
up-or-down vote by the Senate on judicial nominees cleared by the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee."2 43  Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the Republi-
can-controlled Senate in 1997 for delaying confirmation of President Clinton's
nominees, noting that "[v]acancies cannot remain at such high levels indefinite-
ly without eroding the quality of justice," and arguing that, "after the necessary
time for inquiry, it should vote him up or vote him down" to give the President
another chance at filling the vacancy.244
238. For a review of these and other proposals, see John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial
Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 181 (2003).
239. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., A Dangerous Dysfunction, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 2009, at
A31.
240. Timothy Noah, Why Democrats Should Kill the Filibuster: Did Robert Caro Read
His Own Book?, SLATE (June 5, 2003), http://www.slate.com/id/2084031/.
241. Carl Hulse, Democrats Seek Changes in Senate Rules To End Procedural Roadblocks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2010, at A21.
242. Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., Filibuster Reform Both Parties Can Agree On: Presidents
Should Get a Speedy Up-or-Down Vote on Executive Branch Nominees, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 4, 201, at A15-
243. Judicial Vacancies Fact Sheet, FED. B. Ass'N, http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/
Judicial-Vacancies/Fact-Sheet.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
244. William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 1, 1998, as reprinted in Judiciary Report: Congress Is Prodded,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/olloi/us/judiciary-report
-congress-is-prodded.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; see also Linda Greenhouse,
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The challenge for any court will be making the policy choices as to which
reform is optimal. This inquiry raises doubts about the merits of the enterprise
and may point back toward Choperian deference. The current dysfunctional
process at least has the benefit of allowing the branches some room to maneuv-
er and respond to changes in context. If the court were to construct a new con-
stitutional barrier, it would deprive the branches of this flexibility and of the
ability to adopt new optimal strategies over time. This problem is not
game-ending, just game-changing. It leaves open two possibilities.
A. A Constitutional Default Rule
A court could fashion its remedy in the form of a constitutional default
rule. Default rules "govern unless the parties contract around them."2 45 Profes-
sors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner were the first to introduce the concept of
"penalty defaults," which are not designed to give the parties what they "would
have wanted," but "to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to con-
tract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract
provision they prefer."246 In other words, "penalty defaults are purposefully set
at what the parties would not want" in order to encourage the parties to "reveal
information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts)." 4 1
Using the concept of a "penalty default," a court considering the problem
of pro forma sessions could fashion a flexible remedy to the unconstitutionally
paralytic appointments process. By using a default, the court could force reform
while enabling the parties to revise the scheme should it prove unworkable.
A constitutional default rule on appointments could start small, perhaps
requiring an up-or-down vote on all executive officer appointments within six-
ty days of the nomination, such that failure to vote on the nomination within
that space constitutes a rejection of the nominee.
The next question is about what Ayres calls "altering rules"24-that is, the
procedures by which parties may successfully contract around this substantive
default. Perhaps the simplest method in this context would be to require a joint
resolution signed by the President. Through this procedure, parties could revise
this timeline, expand it to encompass judicial nominees, or add any other
reforms.
This approach is plainly problematic. The effects of any judicially imposed
reform are unpredictable; this reform will put pressure on the minority to per-
mit an up-or-down vote, but it will also place pressure on the President to re-
245. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
246. Id. at 91.
247. Id.
248. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934412.
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spond to the faster rejection of his nominees, and on all parties to speed up the
vetting process, and perhaps cause other secondary effects. Moreover, there are
many unanswered questions: Can the President renominate a nominee once re-
jected? What about enforcement? How does this proposal square with the
Court's established reluctance to intervene in the internal rules of the Senate?
In short, calibrating a rule in a way that forces the various parties to come
together to renegotiate terms is a difficult, perhaps impossible task, far beyond
the scope of this Note. Political scientists could help design an optimal default
rule. For now, the best approach seems to be a subtler one.
B. A Subtler Approach?
It is preferable, and far more plausible, for a court to accomplish this inter-
vention in a subtler fashion. Ewing and Kysar articulate a theory of "prods and
pleas" built into the concept of separation of powers." Government actors ap-
proaching the boundaries of their own power "may still acknowledge the se-
riousness of that need and the desirability of action by more appropriate ac-
tors."2"o Such acknowledgment is a familiar feature of RAC jurisprudence. As
courts repeatedly deferred to the executive's broad interpretation of the recess
appointment power, they occasionally signaled their discomfort with the status
quo. Consider the Supreme Court's 2004 denial of certiorari in Evans v. Ste-
phens, in which the Eleventh Circuit upheld President Bush's recess appoint-
ment of William Pryor."' The appointment came at the height of Bush's clash
with the Senate over judicial nominees, and provoked a hostile reaction. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, accompanied by this enigmatic statement
from Justice Stevens:
[I]t would be a mistake to assume that our disposition of this petition
constitutes a decision on the merits of whether the President has the
constitutional authority to fill future Article III vacancies, such as va-
cancies on this Court, with appointments made absent consent of the
Senate during short intrasession "recesses."25
This is the jurisprudence of "prods and pleas." Though the Court declined to
take the case for "valid prudential reasons," Justice Stevens nevertheless ex-
pressed doubt about the circuit court opinion, lest the executive assume see-
mingly limitless appointments discretion. Note the quotation marks around
"recesses," which imply exactly the kind of doubt most likely to make a Presi-
dent nervous about overreaching in his use of the recess appointment power.
Justice Stevens' statement "prods" the executive to exercise caution in making
recess appointments; stronger judicial review remains a possibility.
249. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 50, at 354.
250. Id. at 354.




PRESERVING THE APPOINTMENTS SAFETY VALVE
In an opinion on the pro forma sessions, a court might include language
suggesting, for instance: that Senate filibustering of judicial nominees was likely
unconstitutional; that its stonewalling of any and all nominees for a position
provided for in enacted legislation violated Chadha's bar against the legislative
veto;'" that the President's failure to successfully fill a vacancy within some rea-
sonable period violated the Take Care Clause; that his failure to nominate any-
one to fill the vacancy exceeded his veto power; or the court might simply reite-
rate Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that, after a reasonable time has
elapsed, a judicial nominee should be entitled to an up-or-down vote.
Such dicta might "prod" the other branches to consider reforming the ap-
pointments regime without risking a full-blown intervention beyond the pro
forma sessions. It could raise public consciousness about the appointments pa-
ralysis and pressure the Senate to enact reforms. And, it could signal judicial
impatience over the appointments logjam, which might coerce the legislature
into action.
CONCLUSION
Adjudications of the RAC have hewn to a minimalist approach; courts
have avoided the judicial creativity and engagement with contemporary go-
vernmental context required by the removal case method. This judi-
cial-capital-conserving approach has generated an appointments reform pris-
oner's dilemma: Even as the appointments paralysis has imposed substantial
costs on the executive's ability to effectively enforce the laws, the legislature's
ability to pass them, and the allocation of scarce judicial resources, the various
factions of the Senate and the executive have been constrained from cooperat-
ing on reform by their individual interests. The pro forma sessions offer a
unique opportunity for a court to depart from its minimalist record in RAC ad-
judications. Because they block the constitutional safety valve of recess ap-
pointments, a court should find that these pro forma sessions violate the prin-
ciple of effective execution of the laws embedded in the RAC. Further, a court
could use this opportunity to exert pressure on the Senate to change its obstruc-
tionist ways, either through a constitutional default rule, or more subtly
through a "prod" or "plea."
The judiciary has long provided a strong, independent third voice in dis-
putes between the executive and legislative branches over presidential personnel
control. It is no coincidence that the escalating appointments faceoff between
the political branches occurs in an area (recess appointments) where courts
have been conspicuously absent. The pro forma sessions may provide an oppor-
tunity for a court to heal the injuries caused in part by judicial underreach, and
to get our appointments regime back on course.
253. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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